On the night of 4 August, both ships reported renewed attacks by North Vietnamese patrol boats. In truth, two of the torpedo boats were damaged, of which one could not make it back to port, while a single American aircraft sustained some wing damage. Vaccines. Lyndon Johnson on August 5, 1964, assertedly in reaction to two Unfortunately, much of the media reporting combined or confused the events of August 2 and 4 into a single incident. Like all intelligence, it must be analyzed and reported in context. Cruising twenty-eight miles offshore in international waters, Maddox was approached by the North Vietnamese. Although the total intelligence picture of North Vietnams actions and communications indicates that the North Vietnamese did in fact order the first attack, it remains unclear whether Maddox was the originally intended target. Shortly after ordering the airstrikes, Johnson went on television and addressed the nation regarding the incident. The after-action reports from the participants in the Gulf arrived in Washington several hours after the report of the second incident. Congress supported the resolution with He has appeared on The History Channel as a featured expert. (2021, February 16). They arrived on station overhead by 2100 hours. The most comprehensive and authoritative history site on the Internet. The Taliban silenced him. These types of patrols had previously been conducted off the coasts of the Soviet Union, China, and North Korea. The Truth About Tonkin | Naval History Magazine - February 2008 The historian here is obliged to deal with two basic considerations in offering up an accounting: the event itself -- that is, what actually happened there in the waters off North Vietnam in early August 1964; and the uses made of it by President Lyndon Johnson and his administration. The Gulf of Tonkin Incident famously gave the Johnson Administration the justification they needed to escalate the Vietnam War. The report also identifies what SIGINT couldand could nottell commanders about their enemies and their unreliable friends in the war. Senate investigations in 1968 and 1975 did little to clarify the events or the evidence, lending further credence to the various conspiracy theories. At Hon Nieu, the attack was a complete surprise. A lesser-known fact is that Jim Morrisons father, Captain George Stephen Morrison, commanded the Carrier Division during the Gulf of Tonkin Incident. Sign up to get updates about new releases and event invitations. Summary Notes of the 538th Meeting of the NSC, 4 August 1964, 6:15-6:40 p.m., Foreign Relations of the United States 1964-1968, vol. . "The North Vietnamese are reacting defensively to our attacks on their offshore islands. 10. Carl Otis Schuster, U.S. Navy (ret.) Seventh Fleet reduced it to 12 nautical miles. Heavy machine-gun bullets riddled PTF-6, tearing away part of the port bow and wounding four South Vietnamese crewmen, including Lieutenant Son. On Tuesday morning, Aug. 4, 1964, Defense Secretary Robert McNamara called President Lyndon Johnson with a report about a possible confrontation brewing in southeast Asia. Even in the darkness, the commandos could see their targeta water tower surrounded by a few military buildings. Subscribe now and never hit a limit. Holding their vector despite the gunfire, the boats rushed in, pouring 20-mm and 40-mm fire and 57-mm recoilless rifle rounds into their target.
Gulf of Tonkin - Wikipedia . The maximum closure distance was originally established at 20 nautical miles, but the commander of the U.S. Joseph C. Goulden, Truth Is the First Casualty: The Gulf of Tonkin AffairIllusion and Reality (Chicago: Rand McNally & Co., 1969), p. 80. The Dollar Bill . It is not NSA's intention to prove or Everything went smoothly until the early hours of 2 August, when intelligence picked up indications that the North Vietnamese Navy had moved additional Swatows into the vicinity of Hon Me and Hon Nieu Islands and ordered them to prepare for battle. 1, p. 646. Midday on August 1, NSGA San Miguel, the U.S. Marine Corps SIGINT detachment co-located with the U.S. Army at Phu Bai, and Maddoxs own DSU all detected the communications directing the North Vietnamese torpedo boats to depart from Haiphong on August 2. Incidentally, the first volume, Setting the Stage: To 1959, contains one of the best brief summaries I've read of Vietnam history from the end of World War II through the 1954 Geneva Conference. Two hours later the Phu Bai SIGINT station transmitted a critic report warning of possible [North Vietnamese] naval operations planned against the Desoto patrol. Twenty-five minutes later, Phu Bai sent a second critic report that said, imminent plans of [North Vietnamese] naval action possibly against Desoto Mission.. 2, pp. 11.
2. With that false foundation in their minds, the on-scene naval analysts saw the evidence around them as confirmation of the attack they had been warned about. For the Navys official account stating that both incidents occurred and that 34A and Desoto were "entirely distinct," see Marolda and Fitzgerald, pp. It also outlined the Maddoxs path along the coast on 2 August and the 34A attacks on Vinh Son the following day. Both U.S. ships opened fire on the radar contacts, but reported problems maintaining a lock on the tracking and fire control solution. This is another government conspiracy that's true. The Gulf of Tonkin incident led to the expansion of the Vietnam War that resulted in a lot of American soldier casualties. But, interestingly, on Sept. 18, a similar incident occurred in the Gulf of Tonkin. But in the pre-dawn hours of July 31, 1964, U.S.-backed patrol boats shelled two North For 25 minutes the boats fired on the radar station, then headed back to Da Nang. Westmoreland reported that although he was not absolutely certain why the Swatows were shifted south, the move "could be attributable to recent successful [34A] operations. Speculation about administration motives surrounding the Tonkin Gulf incident itself and the subsequent withholding of key information will probably never cease, but the factual intelligence record that drove those decisions is now clear. Although McNamara did not know it at the time, part of his statement was not true; Captain Herrick, the Desoto patrol commander, did know about the 34A raids, something that his ships logs later made clear. So, whether by accident or design, American actions in the Tonkin Gulf triggered a response from the North Vietnamese, not the other way around. After suggesting a "complete evaluation" of the affair before taking further action, he radioed requesting a "thorough reconnaissance in daylight by aircraft." 1. AND THERE is the fact of Vietnam's position today. Within days, Hanoi lodged a complaint with the International Control Commission (ICC), which had been established in 1954 to oversee the provisions of the Geneva Accords. The Gulf of Tonkin act became more controversial as opposition to the war mounted. In fact, an earlier Desoto patrol planned for February had been canceled because of concerns over potential interference with South Vietnamese commando missions scheduled for the same time. The battle was over in 22 minutes. The subsequent North Vietnamese reporting on the enemy matched the location, course and speed of Maddox. Seeking to follow the established policy of containment, Johnson and his Secretary of Defense, Robert McNamara, began increasing military aid to South Vietnam. President Johnson ordered a halt to all 34A operations "to avoid sending confusing signals associated with recent events in the Gulf of Tonkin." But for a band of South Vietnamese commandos and a handful of U.S. advisers, not much had changed. We have ample forces to respond not only to these attacks on these destroyers but also to retaliate, should you wish to do so, against targets on the land, he toldthe president. The only solution was to get rid of the evidence. As a result, the ships offshore were able to collect valuable information on North Vietnamese military capabilities. THE UNITED STATES NAVY AND THE VIETNAM CONFLICT Volume II: From Military Assistance to Combat, 1959-1965 By Edward J. Marolda and Oscar P. Fitzgerald Government Printing Office for The Naval Historical Center 591 pp. At 0354 on 2 August, the destroyer was just south of Hon Me Island. Neither Herricks doubts nor his reconnaissance request was well received, however. Declassified NSA documents show that US intelligence members concealed relevant reports from Congress to push the narrative of a second attack. . History is who we are and why we are the way we are.. WebThe Gulf of Tonkin and the Vietnam War. Under the operational control of Captain John J. Herrick, it steamed through the Gulf of Tonkin collecting intelligence. Covert maritime operations were in full swing, and some of the missions succeeded in blowing up small installations along the coast, leading General Westmoreland to conclude that any close connection between 34A and Desoto would destroy the thin veneer of deniability surrounding the operations. McNamara did not mention the 34A raids.15. A National Security Agency report released in 2007 reveals unequivocally that the alleged Aug. 4, 1964, attack by North Vietnam on U.S. destroyers never actually happened. By including the orders and operational guidance provided to the units involved, the study develops the previously missing context of the intelligence and afteraction reports from the Gulf of Tonkin Incident. But, to me, the more pernicious deception was this idea that American ships were sailing innocently in the Gulf of Tonkin and were attacked without provocation, he continues. U.S. and South Vietnamese warships intruded into the territorial waters of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and simultaneously shelled: Hon Nieu Island, 4 kilometers off the coast of Thanh Hoa Province [and] Hon Me Island, 12 kilometers off the coast of Thanh Hoa Province." CIA Bulletin, 3 August 1964 (see Edward J. Marolda and Oscar P. Fitzgerald, 5. Through the evening of Aug. 4, while no new information arrivedto clarify the eventin the Gulf, the White House narrative was firmly in place. CIA Director John McCone was convinced that Hanoi was reacting to the raids when it attacked the Maddox. Subscribe to LBJ's War onApple Podcasts. By then, early news accounts had already solidified some opinions, and the Johnson Administration had decided to launch retaliatory strikes. In fact, the United States had been waging a small, secret war against North Vietnam since 1961. In Saigon, Ambassador Maxwell Taylor objected to the halt, saying that "it is my conviction that we must resume these operations and continue their pressure on North Vietnam as soon as possible, leaving no impression that we or the South Vietnamese have been deterred from our operations because of the Tonkin Gulf incidents." It still is not clear whether the order was intended to halt the attack or to delay it until after nightfall, when there was a much greater chance for success. WebThe Gulf of Tonkin While Kennedy had at least the comforting illusion of progress in Vietnam (manufactured by Harkins and Diem), Johnson faced a starker picture of confusion, disunity, and muddle in Saigon and of a rapidly growing Viet Cong in the countryside. 4. The Secret Side of the Tonkin Gulf Incident | Naval History
Unlike McNamara, Johnson, on the morning of Aug.4,1964, was in less of a hurry to respond to an attack. 17. The Gulf of Tonkin incident led to the expansion of the Vietnam War that resulted in a lot of American Scattered small-arms sent tracers toward the commandos, but no one was hurt. You've read 1 out of 5 free articles of Naval History this month. Those same reports were shown to the select congressional and senate committees that also investigated the incident. Thousands of passengers are stranded after Colombias Viva Air grounds flights, The last of Mexicos artisanal salt-makers preserve a 2,000-year-old tradition, I cannot give up: Cambodian rapper says he will sing about injustice despite threats from govt, Ukrainian rock star reflects on a year of war in his country, Ukrainian refugees in Poland will now be charged to stay in state-funded housing, This Colombian town is dimming its lights to attract more tourists to view the night sky, Kneel and apologize!: 76 years after island-wide massacre, Taiwan continues to commemorate and debate the tragedy. On 6 August, Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara told a joint session of the Senate Foreign Relations and Armed Services Committees that the North Vietnamese attack on the Maddox was ". Moises book, however, was based on only the few SIGINT reports he was able to obtain through the Freedom of Information Act. $22. "I think we are kidding the world if you try to give the impression that when the South Vietnamese naval boats bombarded two islands a short distance off the coast of North Vietnam we were not implicated," he scornfully told McNamara during the hearings.16 The reports conclusions about the Gulf of Tonkin Incident are particularly relevant as they offer useful insights into the problems that SIGINT faces today in combating unconventional opponents and the potential consequences of relying too heavily on a single source of intelligence.
Milestones: 19611968 - Office of the Historian The threat removed, Maddox retired from the area to rejoin friendly forces. To have a Tonkin Gulf conspiracy means that the several hundred National Security Agency and naval communications cited have been doctored. In turn, that means a minimum of several hundred persons were party to a plot that has remained watertight in sieve-like Washington for two decades. The United States Military had three SIGINT stations in the Philippines, one for each of the services, but their combined coverage was less than half of all potential North Vietnamese communications. The Gulf of Tonkin incident, like others in our nation's history, has become the center of considerable controversy and debate. Both were perceived as threats, and both were in the same general area at about the same time. With this information, back in Washington President Johnson and his advisers considered their options. Listen to McNamara's conversation with Johnson. Hisfirst ship was USS Glennon (DD-840), a FRAM I destroyer, thesame class as Maddox. They never intended to attack U.S. forces, and were not even within 100 nautical miles of the U.S. destroyers position at the time of the purported second engagement.. Such arguments are rooted in the information and documents released by Daniel Ellsberg and others, and were reinforced over the decades by anniversary interviews with some of the participants, including ships crewmen and officers.
The Secret Side of the Tonkin Gulf Incident | Naval History Suffice to say here that the version as presented here by Marolda and Fitzgerald is highly credible and completely plausible, and I for one am persuaded of its correctness. CIA Bulletin, 3 August 1964 (see Edward J. Marolda and Oscar P. Fitzgerald, The United States Navy and the Vietnam Conflict: From Military Assistance to Combat, 1959-1965 [Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1986], p. 422). This volume deals only with the former.
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